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ABSTRACT 
 
The Role of Domestic Factors in the Formation of Trade Unions:   
A Look at Turkey/EU Relations (April 2008) 
 
Kristina Lynne Youngblood 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Michael Koch 
Department of Political Science 
 
Liberal theories of trade suggest that free trade benefits everyone involved.  To facilitate 
trade specifically, but also economic transactions more generally, states create 
international institutions.  However, not all states are admitted into international trade 
institutions.  Why are some states excluded from institutions that facilitate free trade and 
economic transactions and others denied, when existing theories suggest that all member 
states ultimately benefit?   
 
To answer the broad question I studied Turkey and the European Union (EU).  Turkey 
was officially admitted as a candidate country to the EU in 1997.  Despite efforts to meet 
EU demands, Turkey’s admittance has been blocked.  As recently as 2007 Turkey was 
denied membership, while Romania and Bulgaria were both admitted into the EU.   
 
To explain why Turkey was denied entrance to the EU and Romania and Bulgaria were 
admitted, I use the Selectorate Theory.  The Selectorate Theory states that to remain in 
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power leaders need to provide their winning coalition with public and private goods such 
as tax cuts, security, and even jobs.  Public opinion in a country should relate to the 
leaders position on an issue.   
 
To test the hypothesis that public opinion influences EU country leaders’ policy 
positions on Turkish ascension I use two methodologies.  The first method is a statistical 
analysis of the connection between public opinion over Turkish ascension and 
subsequent government positions on enlargement.  The second is a comparative case 
study of Romania and Bulgaria and their road to EU membership. 
 
 
The data was obtained from the Chapel Hill Political Party Dataset and Eurobarometer. 
After controlling for confounding factors, such as salience, dissent, and economic ties to 
Turkey, public opinion was shown to have a significant effect on the leaders party’s 
public stance on integration.   
The case studies chronicle Bulgaria and Romania’s road to EU membership through 
European Commission.  I highlight the main problems of each country and analyze their 
efforts to reform while contrasting them to Turkey.  
 
A leader’s desire to stay in power causes them to pursue favorable policy.  Turkish 
membership is not favorable policy in contrast to Bulgarian and Romanian membership, 
which was good policy.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
EEC European Economic Community 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
EU 15 First 15 EU Members 
Commission European Commission 
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 In recent years, the dramatic increase in the number of trade blocs, or trade unions, has 
become one of the major developments in international relations.  More than one-third of 
all trade in the world occurs within regional trade agreements (World Bank Staff 2000).  
States form trade blocs in order to reap the benefits of free trade from proximate states.  
In addition to the gains from trade, states benefit in other ways as well.  As noted in 
2000 by the World Bank Staff, “There may be perceived benefits from using a regional 
agreement as a basis for increasing security against nonmembers, and there are some 
examples where this has occurred”.  The best example for this benefit is the European 
Union.  The second benefit “is bargaining power…The EU has probably been able to 
secure more in some international negotiations than its member states could acting 
independently” (World Bank Staff 2000).  The third benefit is ‘lock-in,’ and relates to 
the effect of the regional agreement on domestic politics. Attempts at reform are often 
undermined by expectations of reversal.  A regional agreement can provide a 
“commitment mechanism” for trade and other policy reform measures (World Bank 
Staff 2000).  
 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of American Political Science Review.   
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Given these substantial benefits, countries regularly form trade blocs.  However, some 
states are paradoxically excluded from entrance into international organizations while 
others are included.  The current research does an inadequate job of explaining this 
conundrum.  Why are some states allowed access to international institutions that 
facilitate free trade and economic transactions and others denied, when existing theories 
suggest that all member states ultimately benefit?  This dilemma is particularly 
applicable to the context of Turkish admittance to the EU.   
 
The European Union (EU) is one of the oldest trade unions functioning today.  
Originally envisioned as a coal and steel community between France and Germany the 
Committee for European Economic Cooperation (EEC) formed in 1947 as a response to 
the US Marshall Plan (Dinan 2005).  From those humble beginnings the EU has grown 
to incorporate most of the European continent and is no longer simply the economic 
community that its founders envisioned, but a multinational democratic government with 
ordinances and requirements for entrance.  Membership in the EU provides status, 
opportunities, and security to European countries.  To become a member of the EU a 
country must comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, which are rules regarding a 
country’s democratic institutions, protection of minority and human rights, and market 
economy.  Recently, the EU added many Post-Communist countries such as Romania 
and Bulgaria, proving that the EU can forgive a country for being non-compliant upon 
application for membership.  Turkey is a European country with a questionable past that 
has sought membership in the EEC/EU since its creation.   
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The relationship between Turkey and the EU is both special and long enduring.  Kemal 
Ataturk came to power in the newly created state of Turkey after World War I and the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  As the founder of modern Turkey, he implemented 
the European tactic of nationalism to create a unified new state.  Turkey was established 
as a secular state, without regard to religion, using European governments as a model.  
Shortly after the establishment of the EEC, Turkey began the process for admission to 
the organization; its first official application was in 1959 (European Commission 2007).  
Originally denied membership, Turkey was allowed to enter into a special arrangement 
with the EEC.  Because of their special relationship and geographic closeness, Turks are 
the largest non-EU population living in Europe, over 3 million (European Commission 
2004).    This special relationship continued to evolve until recently when Turkey 
applied for membership to the EU in 1987 (European Commission 1993).  Twenty years 
later, in 2007, Turkey’s dream of membership was once again put on hold despite the 
many benefits that Turkish membership would bring to the EU.   
 
Trade and economic gains are not the only benefits that Turkish membership to the EU 
would bring.  Stability in the Middle East and Caucasus is one desirable and likely effect 
of Turkish/EU involvement.  Turkey serves as a model to other Muslim countries in the 
world as they try to balance democratization and religion, creating secular states instead 
of countries ruled by Islamic Law.  Europe is an aging region with many countries 
experiencing negative population growth; admission of Turkey would offset this 
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negative growth and provide a source of young labor willing to pay into the welfare 
systems of Europe.  Energy is a resource that would benefit from Turkish membership to 
the EU.  Turkey would provide “better energy supply routes for the EU” (European 
Commission 2004).  
 
By examining the case of Turkey and why its attempts at membership into the EU have 
been continually denied over the past 20 years I attempt to discover the rationale behind 
the decision.  I attempt to broaden the understanding of the evolution of trade unions by 
answering the question, “Why are some states allowed to join and others denied?”  
Declining population levels and a growing need for labor among EU countries would 
seemingly predict a greater likelihood for Turkey’s acceptance into the EU, particularly 
given its membership in other Eurocentric organizations such as NATO; unfortunately 
this is not the case.  Turkey is a major political actor in a region where Europe has little 
influence.  Turkey sits primarily in the Middle East, an area rich in oil with historical ties 
to the Balkan Regions (Rouleau 2000).  There are several reasons to admit Turkey, not 
the least of which would be adding a Muslim voice in the struggle to stabilize a conflict-
ridden region for the EU (Rumford 2001).  
 
The advantages of EU membership for democratizing countries are numerous as are the 
advantages gained by the EU from interaction with other countries.  When a country 
applies for membership to the EU they are challenged to improve until they become 
compliant with EU policies and practices.  The recent EU enlargement to include Post-
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Communist countries is a contemporary example of the EU expansion policy.  The 
selectiveness of the enlargement leaves room for interpretation of the results.  Of the 
applicant countries in 2004, three were initially denied admission to the EU.  Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Turkey were the three countries given a second chance to become 
members of the EU.  The year 2007 was proposed as their next opportunity to join the 
EU.  January 1, 2007 came and only two new member states were brought into the EU.  
Romania and Bulgaria became the 26th and 27th member states of the EU, leaving 
Turkey still awaiting its chance to join the EU.   
 
After a close look at the two admitted countries, it is not difficult to see the 
inconsistencies.  Romania and Bulgaria continued to suffer from the same problems that 
the EU Commission outlined in their first responses after the applications of the two 
countries.  Turkey’s evaluation noted significant improvements in all areas 
improvements that were unparalleled in Romania and Bulgaria during their accession 
process.  Turkey offers a functioning market economy and a gateway to Middle-East 
democratization for Europe; however the EU is hesitant to integrate with Turkey.  Why 
were Romania and Bulgaria admitted to the EU, with less to offer and less compliance 
than Turkey?  Why was Turkey denied membership, when membership clearly benefits 
both parties?  
 
To answer these questions, I apply the “Selectorate Theory” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003) which argues that leaders desire to stay in power coupled with the political 
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institutions within their states, creates varying incentives over policy choices that are not 
always congruent with the broader well being of a state’s citizenry.  To prove the 
validity of the theory in this context, I use descriptive historical analysis of the accession 
process to demonstrate the preferential politics influencing the accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria, despite their problems.  Additionally, I employ survey data from European 
countries about their attitudes towards Turkey and compare it to the leading party in 
government’s position on European integration.  Ultimately, analyzing the case of 
Turkey is important because it addresses the larger question of why some countries are 
excluded from trade unions despite the prevailing belief that all member nations benefit 
when nations combine their efforts (World Bank Staff 2000).   
 




Liberal theories of trade suggest that free trade benefits everyone involved.  Free trade, 
as defined by the Center for Trade Policy Studies, is the “lowering and elimination of 
barriers to trade” (Griswold 2005).  Going back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, free 
trade allows states to use their comparative advantages most successfully and leads to an 
increase in goods available and lowers prices (see Krauss 1997).  A simple example of 
the law of comparative advantage would be a law office considering hiring a secretary.  
Currently in the law office, the lawyer answers his phone calls, does his running to the 
court, and types his own briefs.  If the lawyer hires a secretary he has more time to take 
on cases because he can delegate office management to his secretary.  Even if the lawyer 
is more efficient at running the office than the secretary, it is still to his advantage to hire 
a secretary freeing up more of his time for the higher paying aspect of his job (Krauss 
1997).   
 
While economics are important factors in the formation of trade unions, the spillover 
benefits such as security are just as important.  Realist political theory is the philosophy 
that the international community is in a constant state of anarchy because there is no 
sovereign governing the world.  Survival is the most important goal of the state, and 
security is the ultimate public good that a state can provide.  National security policies 
vary across nations; international organizations bring congruence on policy and 
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procedures to the anarchic international system.  The model of complex interdependence 
proposed by Koehane and Nye stresses the roles of international world organizations and 
lessens the influence of individual security policies.  Furthermore, increased trade 
volume between states also has spillover effects, one of which is an increase in security 
(Koehane and Nye 2000).   
 
Upon exiting the state of nature, countries became interdependent upon each other for 
peace.  It follows that the international arena is governed by the interdependent actions 
of states.  Countries depend on each other for their prestige, economies, military 
stability, and communications.  “Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual 
dependence.  Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Koehane and 
Nye 2000).  The interdependence argument states that countries that are dependent on 
each other for benefits are less likely to escalate to conflict because they fear losing the 
benefits that they currently receive.   
 
Democracies are seen as the ideal political structure for interdependent organizations 
because of their very nature.  According to the democratic peace theory democracies do 
not go to war with each other.  There are many explanations offered for this theory but 
the two most important are the shared cultural values argument and the interdependence 
argument.  Among democracies there is a common norm of resolving differences via 
bargaining and compromise.  This makes warfare less likely even if disagreements arise 
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between democracies.  These interdependent relationships lead to research within the 
democratic peace literature (see Rousseau, et al. 1996) that states countries that trade 
together are more peaceful with one another (Reuveny and Kang 1996; Oneal et al.  
1996). 
 
International institutions provide a central authority figure to govern the international 
world, allowing for cooperation.  In the book The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert 
Axelrod (1984) explored the ways that nations arrive at cooperation without a central 
authority figure.  The study of international relations is similar to a prisoner’s dilemma, 
where cooperation is the goal for both actors; however, the fear of defection from the 
opposing actor increases the likelihood that both countries will defect.  The prisoner’s 
dilemma is defined as a circumstance with two actors, in which a choice to defect or to 
cooperate must be made independently.  According to Axelrod, a true prisoners dilemma 
is one in which the participants must make a choice.  The choice results in an ordering of 
outcomes to where mutual cooperation is more desirable than mutual defection, but that 
defection is most desirable, and the least desirable situation is cooperation when the 
other defects. 
 
In the international context, his theory can be applied to trade.  Nations erect trade 
barriers to keep their domestic constituents happy.  Trade barriers such as tariffs and 
quotas often have negative effects on trade and the economy in participating countries.  
Individuals often see trade barriers as protecting their livelihood, when instead they are 
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lowering their income potential.  Free trade is a state of mutual cooperation between 
participating member states where both member states choose not to erect trade barriers.  
Free trade reduces the price of goods in the participating countries because there is not a 
scarcity imposed by a quota and there is no tariff to pass onto the consumer.  To 
facilitate trade, specifically in addition to economic transactions more generally, states 
create international institutions. Specifically, they do so to overcome coordination 
problems as well as informational asymmetries and various other compliance issues that 
may occur (Axelrod 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995; Martin and Simmons 1998). 
 




All of this creates a puzzle of sorts.  Why are some states allowed access to international 
institutions that facilitate free trade and economic transactions and others denied, when 
existing theories suggest that all member states ultimately benefit?  This dilemma is 
particularly applicable to the context of Turkish admittance to the EU.  Turkey’s most 
recent application for full membership was filed in 1987 (European Commission 2007).  
Despite efforts to meet EU demands, Turkey’s admittance has been blocked by 
influential member nations.  This is an issue of concern because Turkey is a lynchpin to 
regional security and is emerging as an economic powerhouse (Rouleau 2000).  The EU 
last opened talks of accession with Turkey in 2000.  Immediately following, Turkey 
began a new wave of reformation that included a decrease in military control of the 
government, acknowledgment of minorities, and improvement of human rights standards 
and freedoms (Hughes 2004).  Despite their adjustments, the EU denied Turkey full 
candidate status in 2002, while agreeing to admit ten primarily Post-Communist 
countries in the 2004 enlargement.  Turkey’s application was put on hold along with 
Bulgaria and Romania’s until 2007.   
 
After denial of membership in 2002 and again in 2007, Turkey faced difficult decisions 
about the country’s future, putting it at a crossroads.  One of the two decisions Turkey 
faced was to continue the reforms begun in 2000 in an effort to bring their government 
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closer in line with EU standards, continuing to seek membership status in the EU.  
Another decision facing Turkey was whether to remain a secular Muslim state, as 
opposed to an Islamic ruled state.  As late as December 2006, officials warned that if 
talks regarding Turkish membership to the EU were called off Turkey could fall back 
into autocracy (Mardell 2006).  These crossroads decisions remain in a tenuous balance, 
and threaten to unravel the progress made thus far.  Democratization in Turkey was a 
long and arduous process that may not be able to recover if the country begins to 
backslide into authoritarian rule.  Admittance to the EU would provide Turkey the 
stability needed to continue down the path of democracy, economic growth, and secular 
government.  Joining the EU would also help to reinforce the tradition of democracy in a 
region with little democratic support (World Bank Staff 2000). 
 
The question remains, why, after acceptance of Turkey as a potential candidate for 
membership in 1999, was Turkey denied entrance to the EU (European Commission 
2007)?  Turkey would economically benefit the EU by providing labor and other 
resources that the EU is currently lacking.  The answer can be found in the Selectorate 
Theory.  Support for Turkish membership is low in EU member states, and leaders 
wishing to remain in power do not want to entangle themselves with such an unpopular 
policy.  Romania and Bulgaria may be less qualified for membership; however, there 
was stronger public support for their membership. 
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Theory 
The Selectorate Theory attempts to explain how leaders maintain power.  According to 
the theory all leaders wish to keep power once it has been given to them.  To maintain 
power leaders must successfully allocate the correct amount of public and private goods 
to the winning coalition allowing the leader to defeat challengers.  A challenger is a 
member of the selectorate that desires to gain power.  To become a leader, an individual 
must have a larger winning coalition than others desiring power.  A leader brings people 
into his winning coalition by doling out public and private goods; members of a small 
winning coalition receive private goods.  Members of large winning coalitions receive 
public goods. However, public goods potentially benefit any member of society not just 
the winning coalition.  
 
Residents, which are the people that live under a government, are separated into two 
groups:  the selectorate and the disenfranchised.  Disenfranchised residents do not have 
the right to vote and their opinion does not matter in terms of policy or leadership.  The 
selectorate is made up of the residents that have the right to vote on government policy 
and leadership.  As defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) the selectorate is “the set 
of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally 
required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to 
private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership”.  The winning coalition is a 
group of individuals from the selectorate that give the leader the right to rule.  In line 
with Bueno de Mesquita et al. the winning coalition is “a subset of the selectorate of 
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sufficient size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with political power 
over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the 
society” (2003).  The winning coalition can vary by size according to each country’s 
laws governing enfranchisement; however, all members of the winning coalition must be 
members of the selectorate.   
 
Support for the leader is gained through the use of public and private goods.  Public 
goods are nonexcludable and nonrival; therefore, private goods are excludable and rival.  
Society as a whole benefits from public goods.  Two important public goods relevant to 
international relations are national security and the promotion of a state’s cultural belief 
system.  Private goods, as related to trade, include subsidies and tariffs.  In relation to the 
EU, entering countries are public goods promoting national security and free trade.  In 
accordance with this interpretation, EU member states should favor integration because 
of the substantial gains from the public goods.  However, members of the winning 
coalition in each respective member state have an opinion of Turkey beyond economic 
and security benefits.  Many Europeans are opposed to Turkish membership to the EU 
and would not support a politician who supports Turkey.  If a leader’s winning coalition 
opposes Turkish membership then this makes Turkey an undesirable good regardless of 
tangible benefits.   
 




To test the hypothesis that public opinion influences EU country leaders’ policy 
positions on Turkish ascension I use two different methodologies.  The first method is a 
statistical analysis of the connection between public opinion over Turkish ascension in 
member states and subsequent government positions on enlargement.  While the 
statistical analysis allows me to test for whether my hypothesis is generalizable across 
governments, it does not give a complete picture of the connections between citizens and 
leaders and the underlying processes. Therefore, I also use a comparative case study of 
Romania and Bulgaria and compare their efforts to join the EU to Turkey.  These three 
countries were evaluated for membership during the same period and have similar 
problems although Romania and Bulgaria were admitted in 2007 and Turkey was denied 
entrance.   
 
 My statistical analysis is a fixed effects model.  However, one problem to overcome 
when studying EU decisions is that the EU does not make the votes of the individual 
commissioners on such issues as enlargement public.  To overcome this problem I use 
the chief executive’s party position on EU enlargement as a proxy for the leader’s likely 
position on Turkish ascension.  Therefore, my dependent variable is the Prime Minister 
or President’s party position on enlargement. To code this variable I employ the Chapel 
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Hill data set on the Positioning of Political Parties1. The data provides a reliable measure 
of party position on the subject of EU enlargement.  The dataset spans the years 1984 to 
20022 and surveys roughly every four years.  The dependent variable I use is called 
Position.  This measure is a scale of one to seven where one represents that the party is 
strongly opposed to European integration and seven means that the party is strongly in 
favor of European Integration.   
 
My key explanatory variable is public opinion on Turkish membership in EU member 
states.  The survey data are from Eurobarometer, a public opinion research and survey 
group by and for the EU Commission.  They conduct a variety of surveys throughout the 
year focusing on major issues that affect Europeans.  The standard Eurobarometer 
survey is conducted twice a year in the fall and spring.  I use the data from 1996, 1999, 
and 2002.  1996 was the first year that Eurobarometer asked citizens their opinion on 
Turkey joining the EU.  The specific surveys employed are: 1996 spring, 1999 fall, and  
                                                 
1 Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Marco Steenbergen and Ryan Bakker. 2005. 
“Crossvalidating Data on Party Positioning on European Integration: A 
Comparison of Manifesto and Expert Data.” Mimeo, downloadable from 
http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe 
 
2 Ray, Leonard. 1999. “Measuring Party Orientations toward European Integration:  
Results from an Expert Survey.” European Journal of Political Research 36: 
283-306. 
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2002 spring.  The specific surveys are numbers 453, 524, and 575 respectively. 
 
I also include a number of variables to control for either intervening or confounding 
effects.  As with parties in the United States, European parties have platforms and 
stances on various issues.  However, not all issues are equally important to every party.  
To control for this I use a measure from the Chapel Hill data called Salience.  Salience 
represents the relative importance of European integration to the party’s public stance in 
the given year.   
 
Another important factor to each EU party is the amount of internal dissent or conflict in 
the party over the issue of European integration. Dissent is an important factor to take 
into consideration because if a party is divided on the issue then the Prime Minister may 
not have the same opinion on European integration as the party.  Because my analysis is 
dependent upon the Prime Ministers party, if his preferences were in disagreement with 
the party this could cause problems with validity.  The Chapel Hill data provides a 
                                                 
 
3 European Commission. Directorate-General X. 1996. Report number 45. Spring 1996. 
Brussels:  E. Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb45/eb45_en.htm 
 
4 European Commission. Directorate-General for Education and Culture.  2000. 
Eurobarometer Public Opinion in the European Union. Report number 52. 
Autumn 1999. Brussels: E. Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb52/eb52_en.htm 
 
5 European Commission. Directorate-General for Education and Culture.  2002. 
Eurobarometer Public Opinion in the European Union. Report number 52.  
Spring 2002. EU15 Report. Brussels: E. Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm 
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measure of internal party dissent.  Dissent is not coded exactly the same across years. In 
the 2002 survey, dissent is measured on a scale of one to ten where one represents no 
dissent and ten represents no cohesion on the issue.  The surveys in 1996 and 1999 use a 
one to five scale from complete unity to disunity.  To account for this I rescale the 
various dissent measures and create a new measure called DISSENT.  I recode the 2002 
data fitting it to the one to five scale used in prior years.  
 
A final variable used to evaluate my theory is economic ties to Turkey.  This is measured 
by the trade ties a country has to Turkey in the given year.  The value recorded is the 
amount of Turkish exports to the stated country.  A country with higher trade ties to 
Turkey is expected to favor Turkish membership in the EU more than a country with 
little or no trade ties.  Countries that trade with Turkey would benefit more from Turkish 
inclusion in the EU internal market because restrictions and tariffs on goods produced by 
or imported to Turkey would be reduced.   
 
To add to my case that public opinion is a major influence on leaders’ policies towards 
European integration, I include a case study of Romania and Bulgaria.  Romania and 
Bulgaria applied for membership to the EU after Turkey and were both accepted as new 
member states in 2007 after initial holds in 2004.  Romania and Bulgaria offer good case 
studies because all three states applied for admission and were originally denied.  Both 
countries are Post-Communist countries with weak economies and corrupt practices; 
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both countries also lack judicial reform.  Many scholars believe that neither of the three 
candidate countries were ready for admittance to the EU in 2007.   




The hypothesis is directional so that when the party favors integration there should be 
more public support for Turkish membership in the EU.  Typically, an Ordinary Least 
Squares regression test would be used to evaluate the hypothesis, but because I only 
have access to a small amount of data a Fixed Effects Model is used instead.  There are 
fourteen countries used in the dataset and I am only using the data from the last three 
surveys; adding in the elections that took place in the year of the survey, there are still 
only fifty observations.  The number of observations shrinks to 47 after discarding the 
observations with incomplete information.  To control for all possible confounding 
factors such as economy, differing electoral rules, and domestic concerns of each 
individual member state, a dummy variable was to be created.  I used Belgium as the 
dummy variable because the capital of the EU resides in this country.   
 
 
TABLE 1.  Effect of Public Opinion on Party Position on Integration 
 
Party Position Integration Coefficients Standard Error P-value 95%Confidence Interval 
Salience 0.7955 0.1514 0.0001 0.486 1.105 
Ties to Turkey 0.0024 0.0003 0.0001 0.001 0.003 
Good Public Opinion 0.0183 0.0095 0.063 -0.001 0.0378 
Dissent -0.0472 0.0472 0.002 -0.254 -0.061 
R-squared = 0.9147       
Degrees of Freedom = 46 
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Table 1 displays the results from the Fixed Effects Model.  The first column lists the 
variable tested against the dependent variable—Party Position on Integration.  The 
second column lists the coefficients.  The third column lists the standard error.  The 
fourth column is of particular importance; it shows the p-value for the variable and its 
statistical significance.  The last two columns show the 95% Confidence Intervals for 
each of the variables.   
 
As expected, the more salient the issue of integration to a party, the higher the support 
for Turkish membership to the EU.  Countries with strong trade ties to Turkey were also 
stronger supporters of Turkish membership in the EU.  Countries that had good public 
opinion of Turkish membership were also in favor of integration.  As predicted, there is 
a negative relationship between integration and public opinion of Turkey in parties with 
a lot of internal dissent. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
 
Romania and Bulgaria, the two remaining Post-Communist candidate states from the 
2004 enlargement, entered the EU on January 1, 2007.  Citizens and governments 
rejoiced at the completion of the monumental task of membership into the EU.  
Euroskeptics and Eurocrats alike were apprehensive about the addition of two of the 
poorest countries in Europe to the elite EU.  Many people in the EU 15, the original 15 
member states, wondered if the EU had been caught in a trap when they admitted 
Romania and Bulgaria.  For the first time since its formation, the EU included 
safeguards to membership in the accession treaties of Bulgaria and Romania.   
 
The 2004 enlargement of the EU brought much of Eastern Europe into the organization 
excluding Bulgaria and Romania.  Romania officially applied to the EU for membership 
on June 22, 1995 with candidate status given by the Commission on July 17, 1995 
(European Commission 1997a).  Bulgaria’s application was not far behind, officially 
applying on December 14, 1995 and candidate status shortly after on January 29, 1996 
(European Commission 1997b).   
 
Neither of the countries were able to gain admission to the EU in 2004; consequently, 
leaders set their sights on the soonest date possible.  Both countries sought reassurance 
from the EU that they were only being left out temporarily and that they would be able 
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to join the union soon.  Fear of the countries backsliding after initial progress led the EU 
to agree to a concrete timeline for accession for the two less reformed countries.  The 
timeline, while helpful for the applicant countries by giving them concrete dates by 
which to implement reforms, hindered the European Commission’s ability to slow the 
accession process.  Conditionality requirements were written into the accession treaties 
of the two countries to help the EU cope with the timeline that they had inadvertently 
committed themselves to.  As the accession date approached, the EU realized that 
Bulgaria and Romania were not as ready to join the EU as they portrayed themselves on 
paper.  This realization caused the EU to invoke additional conditionality to membership 
and still allow the countries to join the EU on January 1, 2007.   
 
Safeguards 
As late as May 15, 2006 the official date of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession remained 
unclear; however, there was little that the EU could do to stop the two countries from 
becoming its 26th and 27th members (Noutcheva 2006).  Scholarly opinion agreed that 
Bulgaria and Romania were not yet politically ready to join the EU, corrupt officials in 
the judiciary and political offices of both countries still heavily influenced policy, and 
there were doubts about their capabilities to function in the internal market. 
 
Postponement of accession by one year was an option for the Commission in respect to 
Romania and Bulgaria; however, with a sense of caution and unease they were allowed 
to become full member states on January 1, 2007 rather than postponing until 2008.  
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Because of the unease from many member states towards Bulgaria and Romania 
additional safeguards were placed on the countries allowing for a three year conditional 
membership (European Commission 2005a).  Reform was a slow process in both 
Bulgaria and Romania and many problems remained unresolved at the moment of 
accession causing a fear among member states that the governments would relax and not 
continue to reform.  Often reforms were carried out only as far as the paper trail.  
Bulgaria and Romania learned early in the process that if the law existed on paper the 
EU was willing to close the chapter, although implementation of the law could take 
many years.  Many reforms were carried out in this way with the countries becoming 
“EU-compliant on paper only” (Noutcheva 2006).  Among member states there was also 
a fear that Bulgaria and Romania were unprepared to integrate fully into the European 
Community (Pridham 2007).  Apprehension accompanied the enlargement of these two 
countries at every turn.   
 
The EU tried to protect itself from the precarious position of admitting a country that 
was not yet ready for admission while not denying admission to a country that needed 
EU support to continue democratization by writing safeguards into the accession treaties 
of Romania and Bulgaria.  Postponement of accession until January of 2008 was the 
most viable safeguard written into the newer accession treaties.  This option, while 
allowing the countries more time to fix their internal problems, was still unfeasible.  The 
postponement clause only allowed one extra year before accession; a very short time 
period for the needed government changes to take effect.  The postponement clause was 
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originally written when Bulgaria had a competent government in power; therefore, 
unanimity was required to postpone the accession of Bulgaria.  However, by May of 
2006, Bulgaria was considered behind Romania in readiness to join the EU (Noutcheva 
2006).  To postpone the accession of Romania, only a qualified majority was needed.  At 
the close of 2004, when the treaties were written, Romania was seen as more of a threat 
to the stability of the community.  While neither of the countries functions at the 
desirable level for a country entering the EU, the fear that the implications of 
postponement would result in a derailment of the democratization process were 
sufficient to guarantee the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
 
In September of 2006 the Commission announced that Bulgaria and Romania would 
enter the EU in 2007 rather than postponing until 2008.  The Commission cited slight 
improvements in judicial reform and the fight against corruption in Romania but 
continued to express concerns.  Postponement was seen as detrimental to the entire 
negotiation process.  As early as December 2005, arguments against postponement 
included the fear that it would be more dangerous for the EU to postpone Romania’s 
entrance by one year than to admit the country unreformed (Pridham 2007).  The 
reforms needed in Romania to fight corruption and overhaul the judicial system would 
take more than one year to implement and get results, making the one-year delay more 
of a penalty for continuing reforms than an incentive.   
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Clauses 
After Bulgaria and Romania became official members of the EU three additional 
safeguard measures would allow the Commission to continue to have leverage over their 
access to EU benefits.  This leverage ideally would ensure that Bulgaria and Romania 
continued to reform post-accession.  These safeguard measures ensure that the 
Commission has the right to intervene and influence policy in the two states for three 
years after their membership becomes official.   
 
Two of the three clauses focus on the economy and economic conditions with the EU 
and its acceding countries.  The first of these is the economic safeguard clause, which 
applies to old and new member states.  This clause is inadequate to put pressure on either 
country to reform.  The clause protects sectors of the economy from the pressures of the 
internal market.  The second clause is an internal market clause pertaining to the 
possibility of taking actions against a country that has an adverse effect on the internal 
market across borders.  Desirable EU structural funds could be taken away from 
Bulgaria and Romania under this clause if they fail to conform to EU market standards 
(Noutcheva 2006).   
 
Judicial practices and corruption are the most prominent problems in Bulgaria and 
Romania.  To address these issues, the third EU safeguard measure focuses on justice 
and home affairs.  While there is little that the EU Commission can do to directly 
influence Bulgaria and Romania in this sector, there are many little ways for EU member 
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states to show their displeasure with the two countries.  For example, decisions by the 
courts of Bulgaria and/or Romania could be disregarded if the EU has little confidence 
in the courts (Noutcheva 2006).  There is a possibility that arrest warrants issued by the 
two countries would be ignored because of displeasure with the police departments’ 
methods of interrogation and apprehension (Noutcheva 2006).  These seemingly small 
measures would be enough to make Bulgaria and Romania feel excluded from the 
benefits of being an EU member state.   
 
Despite the shortcomings of the safeguard clauses, there are other ways to influence 
policy in Romania and Bulgaria post-accession.  Rule of law is a major concern in both 
Romania and Bulgaria.  Common principles binding the EU are “the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law” according to the Treaty on European Union.  If a member state is found to be in 
violation of any of these principles, its peers can take action against the state by 
suspending the states voting rights in the Council.  However, to initiate these protections 
a country must persistently violate the founding principles, and support from a majority 
of member states must exist, to punish the violating country (Noutcheva 2006).  
Romania and Bulgaria must continue to uphold the rule of law and fight corruption 
within their borders so as not to dissatisfy the older member states into taking actions 
against them. 
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Regardless of their shortcomings and apprehension from current member states, Bulgaria 
and Romania acceded to the EU with continued conditionality beyond their accession 
agreements.  Unprecedented conditionality to membership for the two countries puts 
added pressures on them to continue to reform (Pridham 2007).  As members of the EU, 
Bulgaria and Romania continue to be closely monitored for compliance with mandated 
reforms not sufficiently implemented at accession.  Judicial reform is still needed in both 
countries and hinders their economic development.  Marks against a countries’ judiciary 
create an uninviting environment for business investments, potentially threatening the 
slowly evolving economies of these states (Noutcheva 2006).   
 
Romania 
In 1997, the EU released a report detailing their opinion on Romania’s application for 
membership.  This report detailed the requirements for EU membership and the areas 
where Romania needed to improve before they could proceed to candidate status and 
eventual membership in the EU.  The European Commission evaluated Romania 
according to the Copenhagen Criteria established for EU membership.  The Copenhagen 
Criteria mandate that, to obtain membership, a candidate country must have, “stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic & monetary union” (European Commission 1993).  These values are 
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the foundation for the EU and the criteria that all candidate countries must adhere to 
before they can be granted membership.   
 
Findings 
The Commission found that Romania had a functioning democracy but lacked “respect 
in practice for the rule of law” and “fundamental rights” (European Commission 1997a).  
Romania’s economy was transforming into a market economy but lacked property rights 
for land, modern technology, and equipment.  The economy was in need of serious 
structural reform before it could handle the pressures of joining the EU internal market.  
The report concluded with uncertainties.  Romania was judged to be far behind the EU 
in all aspects of membership and the commissioners were unable gauge a date for 
accession.  The Commission did recommend talks be opened with Romania reiterating 
that serious improvements were needed to address its shortcomings (European 
Commission 1997a).  Other concerns included slow economic reform, weak policy-
making environment, and the conditions of institutionalized children (Pridham 2007).   
 
Romania was often viewed as “the ‘laggard’ of Eastern enlargement” (Pridham 2007).  
Many in Europe were apprehensive of the possibility of Romania joining the EU because 
of its seeming inability to reform.  Negotiations were never ceased although there were 
moments in the process where the EU threatened to stop negotiations because of 
Romania’s inability to act.  The progress that Romania made in the areas of judicial 
reform and the fight against corruption were often miniscule and unsatisfactory (Pridham 
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2007).  The Commission was criticized for treating Romania too leniently in the early 
stages of negotiations (Pridham 2007).  Romania was a difficult country to handle during 
the accession process.  Like most former Communist countries Romania had problems 
with corruption and judicial reform, but Romania also had many problems unique to it.   
 
Corruption  
Corruption in Romania was a central point from the beginning of negotiations.  In 
December of 2004, corruption and judicial reform threatened to derail accession for 
Romania.  Romania had made commitments on paper, but had failed to act upon them.  
The failure to implement reforms, on the part of Romania, brought about a compromise 
to close the chapter on justice and home affairs the safeguard clause.  Corruption was a 
problem of most EU candidate countries; however, according to Transparency 
International in 20066 Romania was the most corrupt nation in Europe coming in as the 
84th most corrupt country in the world.  Corruption proved to be a difficult problem to 
solve because of the sheer influence it had on society.  Politicians and officials had no 
respect for the rule of law and continued to make the economy their personal treasury.  
Self-interested politicians were adverse to reform party practices that would endanger 
their patronage systems.  Other problems with corruption that Romania encountered 
were in the public services sector, administration and judicial reform, and the will of 
politicians (Pridham 2007).  To please the EU, politicians would write plans and 
                                                 
6 Transparency International. 2006. "Corruption Perceptions Index."   Retrieved 12 
March, 2008, from 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. 
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strategies to fight corruption; however, their plans were rarely implemented or acted 
upon.  The EU was able to influence the saliency of corruption as an issue over time, but 
the Romanian government did little by way of legislation.   
 
Bureaucracy 
Romania’s bureaucracy was inefficient and incapable of making decisions.  Largely 
overstaffed and underpaid, bureaucratic officials were afraid of taking responsibility and 
make decisions at the lower level, instead sending their problems to senior officials 
causing even more delay (Pridham 2007).  Inefficiency in the bureaucracy caused 
reforms to be slow in implementation, meeting resistance from every sector.  It was only 
after the EU applied direct pressure and influence that the Romanian bureaucracy 
improved.  Departments with more EU contact improved at a more rapid pace often 
functioning on a different level than departments with little or no contact with the EU.   
 
Judicial Reform  
Keeping with the trend of Eastern Europe, corruption and judicial reform were two of 
the more difficult factors facing Romanian accession.  Judges remaining from the days 
of Communism and reliant upon political influence primarily staffed the Romanian 
judiciary.  Under Communism, a political culture of corruption formed; after 
Communism the corruption remained.  Romania eventually created the Anti-Corruption 
Agency after heavy pressure from EU officials, but the Agency was short lived.  
Romania’s Constitutional Court, possibly for challenging the corrupt practices of high-
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ranking officials, declared the Agency unconstitutional (Pridham 2007).  In 2004 the 
European Parliament released a report threatening to suspend Romania’s application if 
the government continued to ignore calls for reform.  The report listed several Romanian 
trouble spots highlighting absent government will to reform in many areas (Pridham 
2007).   
 
Bulgaria 
The EU committed itself to admitting the Post-Communist countries in 1993 (Dimitrov 
2000).  The commission released opinions on applicant countries in the middle of 
Bulgaria’s darkest economic hour, and the EU agreed to open talks with Bulgaria only 
after war broke out in Yugoslavia.  Bulgaria was not as important for the EU 
strategically until the thought of a Balkan crisis on their doorstep gave the country a 
push into the EU.  When the European Commission announced that they would allow 
Bulgaria entrance to the EU in 2007, there was still a laundry list of unfinished reforms 
that needed to be instituted. 
  
Findings 
The Commission released their Opinion on Bulgaria in 1997 highlighting the areas that 
needed improvements per the Copenhagen Criteria.  Bulgaria was found to be a 
functioning democracy without respect “for the rule of law, at all levels of public 
administration” ( European Commission 1997b).  The Roma population in Bulgaria 
suffered from a lack of minority rights.  Corruption, as with most Eastern European 
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countries, was a major red flag for Bulgaria.  Reforms were also needed in the judicial 
system.  The police and secret services were known to abuse individual liberties 
(European Commission 1997b).  A market economy was not well established in Bulgaria 
suffering from a lack of commitment by the government.  Bulgaria had not begun 
privatization of many market sectors until the mid-nineties (European Commission 
1997b).   
 
The European Commission agreed to open accession agreements with Bulgaria in 2000, 
but noted the need for significant improvement.  Human rights was a problem area for 
Bulgaria including slow integration of the Roma population, protection of children in 
orphanages, and protection of civilians against police and the secret service (European 
Commission 1997b).  Corruption and judicial practices were also cited as areas needing 
improvement.   
 
Government 
Bulgaria acceded to the European Union on January 1, 2007 after slow negotiations and 
undersized reform.  In the first years after Communism, Bulgaria suffered from a lack of 
commitment to Europe.  Bulgaria was “governed by scarcely reformed communists” 
until 1997 (Dimitrov 2000).  The EU opened talks with Bulgaria in 1999 more out of 
strategy than because of Bulgaria’s readiness (Dimitrov 2000).  The Balkans had 
recently become a threat to Europe with war breaking out in Kosovo.  The first 11 
chapters of EU membership were opened with Bulgaria in early 2000 and closed rapidly, 
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8 out of the 11 within the first ten months (Dimitrov 2000).  Appearances can be 
deceiving; this result would lead many to conclude that Bulgaria cooperated fully with 
the EU but truthfully all the Bulgarian government did to close the chapters was to 
accept the Copenhagen Criteria (Dimitrov 2000).   
 
Economy  
Trade and the economy were areas that needed much improvement.  Bulgaria traded 
little with influential member states of the EU, such as Germany.  Early economic 
reform in Bulgaria brought private market tendencies but not stability.  Bulgaria asserted 
that by 1999 they had a “functioning market economy” despite the fact that many private 
businesses operated at a loss, and the government continued to own “the national 
telecommunications company and the national tobacco company” (Dimitrov 2000).  The 
ability of Bulgaria to function in the demanding internal market of the EU is hampered 
by an underdeveloped infrastructure that craves investment.   
 
Judicial Branch 
Constitutionally, Bulgaria’s judicial system appeared to function independently and 
made many controversial decisions in the 1990s (Engelbrekt 2007).  Further scrutiny of 
the judicial system reveals many shortcomings.  Much like an Attorney General, 
Bulgaria’s system has a Chief Prosecutor whose job is to “launch civil proceedings, 
engage in civil legislation, order public administrative officials to alter their decisions, 
and ask the Constitutional Court for rulings on the constitutionality of given norms” 
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(Engelbrekt 2007).  The Chief Prosecutor is a very powerful man with the ability to 
influence the fight on corruption; however, in practice no efforts have been made.   
 
Corruption 
Corruption is a common problem of the newest members to the EU.  Corruption comes 
in two forms in Bulgaria, administrative and political (Engelbrekt 2007).  Corruption is 
on the rise in Bulgaria instead of becoming obsolete.  According to Transparency 
International, Bulgaria consistently ranks in the mid-fifties.  Recently, Bulgaria has 
fallen in the ranks from 57th in 2006 to 64th least corrupt country in the world in 2007 
(Transparency International 2006 and 2007).  In 2006, the Center for the Study of 
Democracy released a report detailing which branches of government receive bribes; the 
report found that the judicial system receives less bribes than it had previously while the 
police force receives more (Engelbrekt 2007).  There are no restrictions in Bulgarian law 
on financing political parties and it is estimated that about 1% of Bulgaria’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is used to finance “party infrastructure and “grease the system” 
during the electoral process” (Engelbrekt 2007).  Corruption is a cultural holdover from 
Communism.  Corruption has become so ingrained in the political process of many post-
communist countries that in order to fight corruption completely the movement needs to 
come from the ground up (Engelbrekt 2007).   
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Turkey 
In December of 1997, Turkey was declared to be eligible for EU membership. Two 
years later, in December of 1999, the EU opened accession talks with Turkey (European 
Commission 2007).  Eleven years later Turkey is still waiting to become a member of 
the EU.   
 
Turkish Economy 
In its 2004 Regular Report, the Commission concluded that: 
Turkey has made further considerable progress towards being a functioning 
market economy, in particular by reducing its macroeconomic imbalances. 
Turkey should also be able to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union, provided that it firmly maintains its stabilisation 
policy and takes further decisive steps towards structural reforms. (European 
Commission 2005b) 
 
Of candidate countries in 2005, the Turkish economy was the only one seen as able to 
function in the competitive European Internal Market.  Turkey also has the longest 
sustained market economy of the three countries; as early as 1999, the Commission 
believed that Turkey’s economy would be able to compete with the pressures inside the 
EU (European Commission 1999).  Turkey has good trade balances with neighboring 
countries and an increasing amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) particularly in 
the banking sector (European Commission 2005b).  Turkish GDP continues to grow and 
expand.  The Turkish economy is growing at a rate of 5.2%, a rate much higher than 
most member states of the EU and twice as high as the EU itself, which has a current 
growth rate of 2.8% (Freedom House 2006).  Unemployment is a particular trouble spot 
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in Turkey, hovering consistently around 10% with a slight decrease in 2004 (European 
Commission 2005b).  Increases in the comparative advantages of joining the EU would 
help lower Turkey’s unemployment rate.  Turkey’s seemingly high unemployment rate 
is misleading compared to the EU average unemployment rate of 9.4% in 2005 (CIA 
2006).   
 
Human Rights 
Human rights violations were a barrier to Turkish membership to the EU for a long 
period of time.  Turkish political philosophy saw recognition of minorities as an 
unnecessary divide amongst common peoples, and its EU candidature forced Turkey to 
reevaluate the theory of homogenous democratization in favor of a theory allowing for 
more plurality and respect for minority rights (Rumford 2001).  The Kurdish peoples of 
Turkey have a long history of resistance against the Turkish government.  The Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) was the first organization to unite Kurds together against Turkey.  
Formed on 27 November 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK was presented as a 
“liberation movement” (Gunter 2007).  In practice, the PKK was a terrorist organization 
violently protesting the actions of the Turkish government to suppress their fight for a 
separate Kurdistan.  After the 1999 capture of Öcalan and an initial violent uprising, a 
ceasefire between the Kurds and the Turks was negotiated (Gunter 2007).   
 
The year 1999 was a big year for Turkey politically, not only was there an end in sight to 
the Kurdish issue but they were finally granted candidate status by the EU.  In light of 
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these two developments, Turkey lifted many of the bans placed on its Kurdish citizens 
after they were given candidate status.  Late in 1999, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem broke 
with precedent by announcing plans to extend cultural rights to the Kurdish people, 
giving them the right to use their native language in education and broadcasting 
(Rumford 2001).  Turkey began to give concessions to the Kurdish peoples bringing the 
country closer inline with the EU policies on Human and Minority Rights.  In their 2003 
report, the Commission noted that improvements had been made but that restrictions still 
existed on minority and cultural rights for all groups (European Commission 2003).  The 
Commission’s report in October of 2004 cited Turkey’s significant improvement in the 
area of human and minority rights (European Commission 2004).   
 
Corruption 
Corruption remains one of the most common problems among candidate states to the EU 
and Turkey is no exception.  Measures to reduce the amount of corruption in Turkey 
include the creation of committees to investigate complaints of corruption, and 
becoming members of European organizations such as the Group of States Against 
Corruption (European Commission  2003).  While corruption is a problem faced by the 
Turkish government they continue to pursue anti-corruption legislation.  One former 
Prime Minister and seven former ministers were tried before the High Tribunal on 
charges of corruption in 2004 under the new corruption laws (European Commission 
2005b).  This shows that Turkish politicians are willing to fight corruption even in high 
places.  Transparency International consistently ranks Turkey between current EU 
  39  
member states Bulgaria and Romania, and above Poland.  In 2007, Turkey and Bulgaria 
were both ranked in the 64th most corrupt countries bracket (Transparency International 
2007).   
 




Romania and Bulgaria were admitted to the EU with a cloud hanging over their heads.  
Many reforms were inadequately completed at the time of accession and a culture of 
democracy was not fully institutionalized.  Bulgaria and Romania are member states of 
the EU on paper, although still incompliant with many EU policies.  Without the 
prodding and often interventionist policies of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania would have 
remained outside of Europe.  Why then were they treated differently?  Why, with as 
many problems and difficulties that they encountered along their path to accession, were 
these backwards and often obstinate countries admitted to the EU? 
 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion in the EU for enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania influenced the 
advancement of the two countries.  In the year 1996 the average public opinion in favor 
of Romania’s admission to the EU according to Eurobarometer was the highest of the 
three countries with 39%.  Public opinion against Romania was equally strong at 40%.  
These numbers suggest that Europe is against integration with Romania; however, public 
opinion of Turkish membership is dismal, 35% in favor and 45% opposed.  Public 
opinion of Bulgaria is only a point less than Romania and the same amount oppose 
Bulgarian membership.  Even in the year 1996 Turkey is seen as an unpopular candidate 
country to back for future membership.  Interestingly, according to the 1999 survey, 
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public opinion in favor of both Turkey and Romania dropped two points and rose one 
point for Bulgaria.  By the 2002 survey, there are clear differences in public opinion of 
the three countries applications for membership.  Only 33% of the Europeans favored 
Turkish membership with 46% opposed.  In contrast, Europeans favored Bulgarian 
membership at a rate of 40% and Romanian membership at a rate of 37%.  Public 
opinion was still strongly against the membership of the two countries resting at 37% 
and 40% respectively.  The differences between public opinion in favor and against were 
small, but more respondents were favoring the membership of Bulgaria and Romania 
progressively.  Opinion in favor of Turkish membership was remaining low and 
opposition was growing.   
 
A year after the expansion of the EU to include most of Eastern Europe there was a 
substantial difference in public opinion in favor of extending membership to Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Turkey.  According to the 2005 Eurobarometer7, there was a substantial 
increase in public opinion in favor of enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania over 
previous years, while support for Turkey remained at a solid 32% in the EU 15.  There 
was an 11% increase in support for Bulgarian membership among respondents in 2005 
than 2004; the increase was equally as strong in support of Romania at 10%.  Support for 
Bulgarian membership was 46% among the citizens in the older EU 15 and 70% in the 
10 new member states.  Europeans were not as enthusiastic about Romanian membership 
                                                 
7 European Commission. Directorate General Communication.  2006. Eurobarometer 64 
Public Opinion in the European Union. Autumn 2005. E. Commission. Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htm 
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with 43% of respondents in the EU 15 favoring membership and 58% in the new 
member states.  Although support is not above 50% for Romanian membership 
throughout the entire EU, there is still a 10% difference between respondents that favor 
membership.  This difference translates into over 50% of respondents against Turkish 
accession, 52%.  Only 41% of respondents opposed Romanian accession.   
 
The 2005 Eurobarometer included a section on Turkish ascension to the EU in which 
respondents were asked a series of nine questions and told to answer agree or disagree.  
According to the results, respondents overwhelmingly saw Turkey’s membership as 
flawed.  More than three-quarters of respondents believed that the EU should not admit 
Turkey until there have been significant improvements in the area of human rights and 
the economy.  Over 60% of Europeans surveyed fear that Turkish membership would 
raise immigration to the more developed countries in Europe.  In regards to cultural 
differences, over half of respondents view Turkey as too different from Europe.  
Turkey’s primary benefit to the EU, security, was also viewed negatively.  Only 38% of 
respondents thought that Turkish membership would increase EU security.   
 
Looking at the results from the 2005 survey, it is not difficult to see Turkey’s 
undesirability to EU citizens.  Economics are an area that the European Commission 
praises Turkey regularly; nevertheless, EU citizens still view Turkey’s economy as 
backwards and in need of significant improvement.  Many citizens also see security, a 
major benefit to the EU, in a negative light.  The results of this survey overwhelmingly 
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serve to prove the Selectorate Theory.  Citizens view Turkey in a different light than 
policy makers, but to keep their jobs politicians will represent their winning coalitions.  
The benefits of Turkish membership are ignored and often seen as flawed by citizens, 
despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.   
 
Factors 
The admittance of Bulgaria and Romania is similar to manifest destiny of the United 
States.  Europeans felt that admitting Bulgaria and Romania to the EU was a way of 
reaching their lost siblings.  Cultural issues are also an important consideration.  Turkey 
is over 90% Muslim and has a population the size of Germany.  Its admittance would 
make Islam one of the most practiced religions in the EU.  Bulgaria and Romania are 
small Christian countries, which made enlargement to these countries easier because 
there were less structural issues to consider.  Despite the benefits Turkish membership 
would bring to the EU, the domestic factors forming public opinion of Turkey 
sufficiently render its membership a taboo stance by any politician desiring to remain in 
power. 
 




As shown with the statistical analysis, party leaders provide their constituents with 
public goods to stay in power.  Turkey would be a great benefit to the EU in a myriad of 
ways; however, pubic opinion in favor of Turkish membership is low.  In the years 
included in the statistical analysis, public opinion never rose above 51% in the 
Netherlands in 1996.  Public opinion in favor of Turkish membership was lowest during 
1996 in Greece at just 10%.  Since public opinion in favor of Turkish membership 
hovers around 32%, leaders are unable to pursue the benefits of including Turkey in the 
EU without fear of losing their positions in power.   
 
Bulgaria and Romania had many problems meeting the demands of the EU during the 
accession process, leaving many reforms to the last minute and even more incomplete.  
Economically, neither Bulgaria nor Romania is expected to function well with their 
current infrastructure.  Implementation of the Euro in the near future in either of these 
countries is a false hope.  Their lack of commitment to one clear economic policy 
hinders any development that would reduce inflation and balance their budgets.  The 
economy is so small in Romania in particular that in ten years it’s expected to grow to 
the size of Hungary’s current economy.  In contrast, Turkey’s budget is balanced with 
few trade deficits and a strong stable currency.  The process of adopting policies to bring 
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Turkey into the Euro community has already begun.  The Turkish economy is growing at 
rapid rates, well above the EU average.   
 
Corruption is a way of life in Bulgaria and Romania and measures to fight corruption are 
few and weak.  Politicians have little incentive in these countries to fight corruption 
because they derive their political support from these practices.  Turkey has created 
many committees to aide in the fight against corruption, and has even brought corruption 
charges against former senior officials in the country.  Officials in Turkey are willing to 
fight against corruption and bring their policies inline with the EU. 
 
Judicial branches suffer from a lack of commitment from high-ranking politicians to 
reform.  The judicial branch often suffers from corruption in Romania and Bulgaria.  
Judges in Romania and Bulgaria have little support from politicians to investigate 
corruption and often declare anti-corruption legislation unconstitutional.  Turkey had 
minor problems with the judicial system that were resolved primarily by the formation of 
civilian courts, and the removal of the military from the judicial branch.   
 
Human rights violations were an issue with all three countries.  Specifically, Bulgaria 
and Romania had difficulties integrating their Roma populations into civil society.  
Turkey relinquished rights to their Kurdish minority that were unprecedented only 
fifteen years ago.  Broadcasting in Kurdish and naming children Kurdish ancestral 
names are no longer forbidden.  Torture and the death penalty have been abolished.   
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With regard to each other, Turkey appears to be more compliant with EU policies and 
economic criteria.  Turkey is the only country associated with the EEC that has not 
gained membership into the EU.  The lengthy relationship between Turkey and Europe 
proves Turkey is committed to reformation and EU membership, despite the reluctance 
shown by Europe.  Bulgaria and Romania are more recent applicants to the EU with 
substantial problems; conversely, they were admitted because of strong public support 
for their membership after 2004.  In the case of Bulgaria and Romania it is clear to see 
that public opinion influenced leaders’ positions on their integration.  Favorable public 
opinion in Europe for Bulgaria and Romania allowed leaders to pursue their 
membership, despite the unwillingness of the countries to comply with EU demands.   
 
Leaders pursue policies that lengthen their tenure in power.  The policies that leaders 
pursue must be supported by a large enough size of the selectorate to ensure their 
reelection.  A population must either support a policy or be apathetic on the issue in 
order for a leader to actively support the issue.  Because there is little support for Turkish 
membership in the EU, a politician is only likely to favor membership when he has a 
large enough winning coalition to absorb the affects of his position.   
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10. United Kingdom 
11. Portugal 
12. Austria 
13. Finland  
14. Sweden 
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APPENDIX B  
 
Means Table 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Ma 
partyposon~n 47     6.161064     0.7012109                 3.5 7 
Salience 47     3.406228  0.5052361       2.44        4.14         
Dissent 47       2.6897        1.177187        1.33        6.08        
Tiestoturk 47          890.2128     1282.317        42 5460 
Goodpotky 47  33.42553     10.01682        10   51 
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